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Scientiﬁc advice on the move: the UK mobile phone
risk issue as a public experiment
Jack Stilgoe1
ABSTRACT The UK controversy over the health risks of mobile phones was at its peak
around 1999–2000, at a time when policymakers were beginning to endorse moves towards
greater openness in the practice of expert advice. One explanation for the subsequent
calming of this controversy is that people’s sense of the beneﬁts outweighed the minor
uncertainties. However, this fails to explain the politics of mobile phone technology and, by
positioning expert advice as neutral, offers no lessons for future expert practice. In this article,
I argue that the mobile phones case can more productively be seen as one of public
experiment. Rather than seeking closure, experts opened up the issue, made explicit pre-
viously obscured uncertainties and invited new research questions. In doing so, they remo-
bilised previously static constructions of both science and public concern. This analysis
challenges the distinction between science-as-expertise and science-as-experiment, with
important implications for advisory practices and structures. This article is published as part
of a thematic collection dedicated to scientiﬁc advice to governments.
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Introduction
Deep within the less glamorous pages of the Apple web site,in the small print of the “legal” section, sits a table of datarelating to the electromagnetic ﬁelds (EMF) generated by
the latest iPhone. This tells me that the maximum Speciﬁc
Absorption Rate at which my body takes in electromagnetic
energy from this phone is 0.98 watts per kilogram, averaged over
10 grams of body tissue, regardless of whether I’m making a call
holding it to my head or sending an email with it resting on my
lap (see https://www.apple.com/legal/rfexposure/iphone7,2/en/,
accessed 1 June 2015). When the thing is transmitting at full
power on Bluetooth, cellular and wireless networks, the exposure
could in theory get close to the threshold of 2 watts per kilogram
established by the International Commission on Non-Ionising
Radiation Protection (ICNIRP), but I can rest assured that the
iPhone, like all other phones sold internationally, complies with
this standard. If for some reason I am still worried, the Apple web
site advises:
To reduce exposure to RF [radio frequency] energy, use a
hands-free option, such as the built-in speakerphone, the
supplied headphones, or other similar accessories
In this statement is captured a paradox that characterizes the
now almost dormant controversy about the health effects of
mobile phones. I should, I am told, have no reason for any
concerns about the phone’s impact on my physiology. And yet
the provision of information, at the behest of the UK
Government, legitimates concerns or questions that I might
have. I am permitted a modicum of uncertainty, as is the
company selling me this product and the regulator deciding on
guidelines. If technology is a social experiment (Krohn and
Weyer, 1994) then I can, if I wish, regard myself as an
experimental subject.
Concerns about the health risks of mobile phones have largely
faded from public consciousness, at least in the United Kingdom.
Some people may recall widespread public attention near the turn
of the millennium to questions about our phones microwaving
our heads or giving us cancer but, in the years since, the uptake of
the technology has advanced seemingly without hesitation.
A 2013 survey conducted by polling company YouGov on
behalf of a British mobile phone trade body found that less than a
tenth of the population thought that mobile phone handsets or
masts were a problem for their health (Figure 1). In 2000, this
ﬁgure was 27% (see graph below). Since 2000, mobile phone
ownership went up from 50% of the survey respondents to 100%.
Over the same period, the uses of mobile technology have
proliferated as phones have got “smart”, without generating
substantially greater electromagnetic ﬁelds. (Part of the reason for
this is that mobile phone base stations have become more
numerous and can therefore connect with handsets at lower
power.) Concerns that we have about mobile phones are now
more likely to relate to the privacy of our personal data or being
deprived of a technology on which we have become dependent.
The straightforward explanation for the demise in general
public concern about this now-ubiquitous technology is that
sensible users are calculating that perceived beneﬁts clearly
outweigh perceived risks. There is of course some truth to this.
But its banality obscures what I believe is a far more interesting
and far more important discussion about scientiﬁc advice,
uncertainty and the politics of regulation. The science of mobile
phone risk is far from settled. Uncertainties remain, if one
chooses to look for them (Boschen, 2010), relating to the effects of
pulsed rather than continuous EMF radiation and the vulner-
ability of particular subgroups, some of whom regard themselves
as “electrosensitive”. The voices of concerned scientists can still be
heard (for example, Sage and Carpenter, 2009) and some advisory
bodies continue to draw attention to troubling epidemiological
data, criticizing industry bodies for their “inertia” (for example,
EEA, 2013). In 2011, the International Agency for Research on
Cancer classiﬁed radiofrequency EMFs as a “possible human
carcinogen” (Baan et al., 2011) (Extremely low frequency EMFs,
such as those produced by overhead power cables, were
categorized in the same way a decade earlier). But these
uncertainties seem, at least for now, at least in the United
Kingdom and at least for most of the population, under control.
In this article, I argue that the British experience with mobile
phone risks is an instructive example of the practice of expert
advice in which success might be described in terms of public
experimentation. Rather than regarding the issue as a static one,
characterized by scientiﬁc evidence and reactionary public
opinion, advisory scientists, in recognizing the instability of a
previous consensus, did not seek to restabilise the scientiﬁc
evidence, but rather to regard it as a work in progress, an
experimental exploration of uncertainties that involved publics as
well as experts. This offers another way of viewing the twenty-ﬁrst
century trend in UK science governance towards greater
“openness”.
This article revisits, updates and develops qualitative research
conducted at the time of the original controversy, which included
more than 30 interviews with scientists, stakeholders and
members of relevant expert committees. Reﬂecting on how this
issue became an issue and then, at least in the United Kingdom, a
non-issue for all but a small subset of interested publics, the
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Figure 1 | Percentage mentioning handsets/masts as a concern.
Source: YouGov survey 2013 http://www.mobilemastinfo.com/opinion-research/opinion-research.html. Base: All GB adults (2,164). P10Q1: What,
if any, health-related dangers concern you most nowadays? P15Q1: And which other health-related dangers are you also seriously concerned
about?
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conclusion is that a ﬁxation on “closure” in some social studies of
expertise and controversy, even if closure is considered to happen
socially rather than scientiﬁcally (for example, Latour, 1987;
Collins and Evans, 2002; Sismondo, 2011) misrepresents the
practice of expert advice, in particular by exaggerating the
importance of scientiﬁc certainty. The case of mobile phones and
health and its reconstruction in part through the actions of an
expert committee challenges this teleology of closure. Here is a
story of intentional opening-up, coming at a time in which
openness was being pressed upon British political culture, in
which uncertainty was publicly acknowledged and the mobile
phones health issue was recognized as open-ended. This case
offers lessons not just for our understandings of expertise in
society, but also for advisory practices and structures.
Expertise as dynamic and relational
The paradox of expertise, as described by Bijker et al. (2009) is
that as we rely on experts more and more, we trust them less and
less. To further complicate this paradox, we can also observe that
it is not at all clear what it means to be an expert. Lentsch and
Weingart (2011) rightly point to a lacuna in thinking about the
design of advisory processes and institutions. Nor do we have any
good way of talking about the quality of expert advice. Expert
advice is as old as the institutions of science themselves and yet
there is little agreement on what it is, what it is for, when it is
good and when it is bad.
The grand narrative of expert advice, discursively bolstered
from both the scientiﬁc and policy sides, is of science “speaking
truth to power” (see Wildavsky, 1979). This linear model, in
which science is presumed to be autonomous and value-free, has
been challenged by Science and Technology Studies (STS)
accounts of expertise. The constructivist critique of the “truth
to power” model of expertise begins with the realization that
expertise does not neutrally inform policy-making. It can instead
be used to add weight to a predetermined position (Nelkin, 1975),
giving the impression that a decision is technocratic. The linear
model “requires politics to masquerade as science, with scientists
either making covert political judgements or having their
judgements politically misrepresented as sufﬁcient and decisive”
(Millstone and van Zwanenberg, 2001: 100). This has led some to
observe that science is largely irrelevant in decision-making. It is
either accepted if it supports a policy consensus, or obfuscated in
technical debate if it proves problematic (Collingridge and Reeve
1986). The higher the stakes, the more likely expertise is to be
twisted in this way.
However, if we refuse to accept the political neutrality of
experts, we can, as STS has been able to do over the last three
decades, develop a richer account of expertise that opens the
space for an appreciation of the constructive role that experts
clearly do play in the construction of policy. As Jasanoff (1990:
229) argued so powerfully, when experts are brought to bear on
decision-making, “what they are doing is not ‘science’ in any
ordinary sense, but a hybrid activity that combines elements of
scientiﬁc evidence with large doses of social and political
judgement”. Policy issues are chronically underdetermined by
scientiﬁc evidence. Without democratic scrutiny, the space of
judgement that is opened up creates a risk of “scientism”,
whereby “scientiﬁc advice and authority [are] systematically
exaggerated in regulatory control and public debate” (Doubleday
and Wynne, 2011).
The relevance of experts and their advice is determined not by
scientiﬁc criteria but by the demands of policy. The science that
might inform a particular policy issue does not come pre-packaged.
It must be assembled for particular purposes. The incompleteness
of this reassembly inevitably means that important decisions turn
on questions of uncertainty. STS accounts of science in public have
explained the efforts of experts to tame uncertainty, epistemolo-
gically and socially (Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998). Within a linear
model, scientiﬁc uncertainty tends to be seen as undermining the
authority of experts, and is therefore an embarrassment to be
rationalized, reduced or hidden.
The deconstruction of simplistic models of experts’ relation-
ships with decision makers has generated a minor intellectual
backlash. Harry Collins and Robert Evans (2002) have put
forward an alternative theory of expertise. For many of those
involved in empirical studies of expert-public encounters, their
contribution, which attempts a reconstruction of the separation
between science and politics that has been challenged by STS
research, would seem to subtract from the sum of human
knowledge. However, their provocation has elicited numerous
responses that have helped to clarify the value of STS in closely
researching expertise in action, explaining its dynamics and
offering constructive suggestions for improved models.
Collins and Evans (2008), extending their argument in a
subsequent book, reduce the challenge of expert advice to one
question: “who knows what they are talking about?” They focus,
as Wynne puts in a response to the original paper, on
“propositional decision-questions such as whether nuclear power,
anti-misting kerosene or UK beef is safe”. For Wynne (2003), this
represents “a seriously impoverished account of what is involved
when we address science in public arenas” (401–402). Collins and
Evans harbour a suspicion, for which there is little evidence, that
debates about expertise are a form of battle for knowledge
between experts and non-experts. There are cases where policy-
makers will urgently need technical answers during an acute
challenge: Could volcanic ash clog the engines of aeroplanes? Is
this storm likely to hit a city? Might this damaged nuclear power
plant generate a radiation leak? But anyone who has been
involved in the construction, provision or reception of expert
advice knows that the challenges are rarely just epistemic. Even
the institutions of scientiﬁc advice themselves recognize that this
does not describe their contribution. Bodies such as the National
Academies see scientiﬁc advice as more to do with processes
rather than a body of knowledge (Fears and Ter Meulen, 2011:
346). The job of experts is more often one of sense-making than
fact-making. In addition, to presume that expertise is about who
knows best is to ignore the wealth of evidence (for example,
Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998) that scientiﬁc certainty does not
translate to policy consensus. Indeed, as Sarewitz (2004) has
argued, in cases where stakes are high and the politics are
polarized, the injection of science may worsen the controversy.
Rather than being the cause of political controversies, scientiﬁc
uncertainty tends to be their product (Campbell, 1985; Yearley,
2000). Given that policy concerns are not deﬁned by their
scientiﬁc content, Marres (2007) calls for greater attention to the
public reframing of issues, following in the tradition of pragmatist
philosophers like John Dewey. Dewey advocated expanding
scientiﬁc experimentalism beyond science. For Dewey, and the
sociologists he would inﬂuence (particularly those of the early
twentieth Century “Chicago school”), society and democracy
were best understood, and conducted, as grand experiments
(Haworth, 1960; Gross and Krohn, 2005). While we can
recognize, and even highlight, the place of science and technology
in public issues, to say that they are “scientiﬁc controversies” or
even “science-based controversies” (Brante et al., 1993) is
misleading. These experiments are more than scientiﬁc. Indeed,
for Gross (2016), laboratory experiments are merely part of the
broader set of intentional and accidental experiments that
constitute public life. For experts, “knowing what they are talking
about” is as much a challenge of understanding the politics of the
issues under question (such as, in Pielke’s (2007) terms, the
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distinction between “abortion politics” and “tornado politics”,
and its implications for expert roles) as it is of grasping technical
details.
Science can at times offer closure, but non-scientists will still
ask relevant questions. In real-time public science, policy and the
public, rather than forming neat rings around science (as in the
Collins and Evans model), are endogenous to the construction of
relevant expertise.1 Jasanoff’s (2004) more convincing and more
widely accepted explanation is that scientiﬁc and social orders are
coproduced in public, and experts may be at the heart of this
process of coproduction. Susan Owens, also responding to Collins
et al. (2011), describes her experience with the Royal Commission
on Environmental Pollution, for which she was a member as well
as an observer and historian, in these terms. The Royal
Commission, now disbanded, was a prominent “committee of
experts” (to be distinguished from an “expert committee”). Using
examples from its history, Owens reiterates that public
controversies involving science are never merely about technical
questions (see also Fischer, 2009). The task of both experts and
those who study expertise in action is not to purify and separate
science, but rather to “learn to live with co-production and
nurture it as a positive force” (Owens, 2011: 330). In British
political history, the Royal Commission stands out for its ability
to do this, to reframe policy issues as a challenge to policy—
asking new questions rather than merely providing the best
available answers to questions set by policymakers.
Collins and Evans presume that the relevant experts for a
particular policy challenge can be identiﬁed ex ante, and their
worth assessed according to their scientiﬁc merit. In which case, it
is hard if not impossible to explain the selection of experts to
appear on the Royal Commission, the committee that took
control of the mobile phones issue, or indeed many other
advisory committees in UK policy. Such committees typically
recruit not just from pool of experts with prior attachments to the
relevant scientiﬁc questions, but also from a cadre of senior
individuals with track records in managing complex issues.
Expertise is, in Nowotny’s (2000) words, “transgressive compe-
tence”. As former President of the Royal Society Martin Rees
(2002) has put it, experts are “depressingly ‘lay’ outside their
specialisms”. Experts are valuable not just for what they know,
but also for how they are able to operate outside their own
immediate domains. Expert roles differ from scientiﬁc roles. It is
here that the risk of scientism arises, as expert meanings are
imposed onto public issues, which can and should be mitigated.
However, we should not pretend that experts stick only to their
“expertise”, just as we should not pretend that they only speak
about facts. We should therefore understand expertise not as a
mere resource, but as relational and dynamic. Issues wax and
wane, public concerns change and evidence moves in and out of
relevance. Uncertainties can shrink, but they can also multiply
with the reframing of issues. Experts are actively involved not just
in the marshalling of science, but also in the management of
science/policy hybrids (Miller, 2001) and the conﬁguration of
boundaries (van Egmond and Bal, 2011). Studying expert advice
in practice, we can therefore ask how reﬂexive experts are about
such activities. This reﬂexivity is a crucial dimension of “open-
ness”, if that term is to be anything other than vacuous.
Following Werner Heisenberg’s deﬁnition of an expert as
“someone who knows some of the worst mistakes that can be
made in their subject and who manages to avoid them” (quoted in
Keane, 2009), we can equate expert wisdom with the ability to
navigate and makes sense of uncertainties (Stilgoe et al., 2006).
Expertise, therefore, is an act—performative as well as epistemo-
logical. Stephen Hilgartner (2000) develops this point in his
analysis of expert advice as drama. For Hilgartner, as for others
(Shapin, 1995; Brown and Michael, 2002), expert advice is a project
of credibility. Where once scientists could rely on a degree of public
authority, they now need to earn their right to talk credibly in
public on any particular issue. In his earlier work, Collins (1988)
considers the staging of public “experiments” in the search for
credibility. Such experiments—he gives the examples of a simulated
aeroplane disaster and a televised crash involving a train and a
nuclear fuel storage container—are, for Collins, a form of
“pathological science”. Rather than engaging with uncertainty, they
keep it hidden from public view. The possibility of surprise, one of
the key characteristics of real experimentation (Rheinberger, 1997)
is virtually nil. These “experiments” are mere demonstrations,
displays or performances. However, the theatrical metaphor only
gets us so far. If we are to take seriously the possibility of opening
up and democratizing expert advice, we should revisit the idea of
public experiments and ask what it would take to make expert
advice genuinely experimental.
The public image of science can resemble the Janus described
by Bruno Latour (1987: 4). One face—“science in the making”—
points towards the internal processes of science, experimentation,
uncertainty and open controversies while the other looks back at
the “ready made science” of certainty, closure and facts. Expertise
is conventionally seen as the speech of the latter face, exuding
authority and conﬁdence. In terms of policy, this is the domain of
“science for policy”, rather than the separate set of considerations
concerning “policy for science” (a distinction drawn by Brooks
(1964), though he recognized some of its problems).
Expert advisors need not and should not accept such
dichotomies. Pielke and Betsill have described how the reality
of science policy is often closer to “policy-for-science-for-policy…
a recursive process of deﬁning societal goals, using those goals to
identify questions to be addressed by science, then relating the
ﬁndings of science back to the original goals, and if necessary,
revisiting the goals themselves”. (Pielke and Betsill, 1997: 158).
Turning attention to expert advice to provide a new starting
point, we can explore the potential of “science-for-policy-for-
science” in expert practice. Part of the novelty of the approach
taken by British scientiﬁc advisers with respect to mobile phone
risk was their willingness to entertain not just existing evidence
but also new research agendas and experimental goals. To the
extent that these goals were reframed through public engagement,
this was therefore a case of public experimentation.
The politics of SAR
Guidelines for exposure to EMFs have existed globally since the
late 1950s, although there was originally little agreement between
countries as to what they should be. In the United Kingdom, the
ﬁrst scientiﬁc advice regarding exposure to EMFs was an
exposure restriction addressed to workers in the Post Ofﬁce
(Home Ofﬁce, 1960), which, at the time, also managed radio
transmissions. In 1989, the National Radiological Protection
Board (NRPB) published the ﬁrst UK guidelines on exposure to
EMFs based on a thorough review of the available science. These
guidelines, as well as suggesting restrictions on ﬁeld strength
exposure, suggested basic restrictions based on SAR (which
measures absorption), following the lead of American bodies,
who had been the ﬁrst to provide a dosimetric set of guidelines
(measuring the dose absorbed by the body) in the early 80s2
(Kuster and Balzano, 1997).
The 1989 guidance drew on scientiﬁc responses to two
consultation documents (NRPB, 1982 and NRPB, 1986). The ﬁrst
of these noted that “the public has become increasingly aroused to
the possibility of hazards to health from exposure to non-ionising
electromagnetic sources of radiation such as microwave ovens,
radar and radio equipment, lasers and overhead power lines”
(NRPB, 1982, Foreword). All of these technologies had previously
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been associated with public doubts about safety, despite generating
non-ionizing radiation (less energetic than ultraviolet light and
therefore conventionally seen as incapable of causing permanent
tissue damage).
SAR is a measure of absorption, a measure of the rate of
absorption and it is speciﬁc (to the tissue that is absorbing the RF
energy). The effect it measures is one of heating, the same thermal
effect that powers microwave cooking. Knowledge of this effect
and its mechanism is at the centre of “what science knows”
(Epstein, 1996) about the health effects of microwaves. The power
of a mobile phone (less than one watt) is less than a thousandth of
the power of microwave oven, but mobile phones are usually held
next to a headful of wet, sensitive tissue. The assumptions that
underlie the calculation of SAR and its selection as the relevant
metric for setting guidelines, are based on a scientiﬁc consensus as
to the known effects of non-ionizing radiation. SAR is intended as
an authoritative representation of certainty, of a known effect.
The reassurance offered was that if there was no signiﬁcant
thermal effect there was no reason to worry (Stilgoe, 2005).
As one NRPB spokesman put it in 1999, “If it doesn’t heat you,
then it doesn’t harm you”.3 For critics, SAR guidelines were seen
as a solidiﬁcation of regulatory assumptions. They therefore
became the battleground for controversy over the health risks of
mobile phones (see Stilgoe, 2005).
Just as it is hard to record the time and place at which public
science controversies die, so it is hard to know precisely when they
begin. For mobile phones we can point to some well-cited events,
such as the case of a man in America who in 1992 sued the
manufacturer of his wife’s cellphone after she was found to have a
brain tumour. By the time that a federal judge had ruled that the
submitted evidence was not “scientiﬁcally valid”, news media in
Europe had begun to report similar stories (Burgess, 2004).
Campaigners and investigative journalists (following the lead of
Brodeur (1989)) began to unpick the technical basis for EMF
regulation, drawing attention to uncertainties relating to possible
non-thermal effects and epidemiological studies that appeared to
point to dangers from long-term, cumulative exposure. Suggestions
of these effects had circulated in the scientiﬁc literature for decades,
but were not considered sufﬁciently troublesome to ﬁgure in British
or US regulation (Stilgoe, 2005). As well as drawing attention
to paradigmatic differences between physicists and biologists
in the uneasy portmanteau discipline of “bioelectromagnetics”
(Miller, 2005) campaigners highlighted international regulatory
disagreements.
For many years the countries of Eastern Europe and the
former Soviet Union had suggested very different standards,
orders of magnitude more stringent than those adopted in the
United Kingdom. Activists have drawn attention to these
disagreements (Maisch, 2000), reporting that, at one meeting
in 1999, a Russian regulatory body claimed that non-thermal
effects, cumulative exposures and subjective symptoms experi-
enced by users should be taken into account, while ICNIRP
insisted that the only effects from which conclusions could be
drawn were thermal (Soneryd, 2007).
Mobile phones technologies are tangible and, in the case of
large mobile phone masts, all too visible for some local residents,
but the source of concern is invisible. The public experience of
electromagnetic ﬁelds is therefore unavoidably mediated through
expertise and technologies of measurement. Other than those
people who claim to be “electrosensitive” (detecting and suffering
from surrounding ﬁelds) (Soneryd, 2007; De Graaff and Bröer,
2012) or those who, as electrosensitive people often do, arm
themselves with personal dosimeters (see Mitchell and
Cambrosio, 1997), EMFs remain uncanny (or, as Nordmann
(2005) puts it, “noumenal”). In the main, to use the distinction
adopted by Soneryd (2007; following Michael, 2002), our
comprehension of EMFs is detached from our embodied
prehension. The trust relationship that this entails made the
NRPB’s approach to public reassurance particularly brittle in the
face of public challenge (Stilgoe, 2005).
Opening up
Under the auspices of the NRPB, who managed the issue until the
end of the 1990s, the uncertainties surrounding mobile phone
safety were cordoned off from wider scrutiny. Public questioning
was met with reassurance that all currently available technology
complied with regulations (Stilgoe, 2005). The science was hidden
behind public statement and restatement of SAR guidelines.
As controversy over mobile phones grew, alongside their rapid
uptake during the 1990s, the NRPB’s stock response drew
criticism. During a House of Commons Science and Technology
select committee enquiry in 1999, the NRPB’s director, Roger
Clarke said that “all marketed telephones meet our exposure
guidelines and as such there is no need for any further
consideration” (quoted in Stilgoe, 2005). The mobile phones
health controversy can be seen as a public rejection of this
statement. Relevant publics saw many reasons to consider issues
beyond compliance, and, as described elsewhere (Stilgoe, 2007),
the NRPB’s intransigence led to it losing control of the deﬁnition
of relevant uncertainty (cf Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998). Towards
the end of the 1990s, mobile phones ownership was taking off and
network expansion necessitated the building of thousands of new
base stations. Licences for third generation mobile phone
bandwidth had been auctioned, giving the Government a £22
billion windfall. (The economists involved in its design trumpeted
it as “the biggest auction ever” (Binmore and Klemperer, 2002)).
As the stakes rose, so the NRPB’s lack of control became clearer.
The NRPB’s inability to respond to public questioning led to a
collapse in its credibility, prompting the government to create a
new body, the Independent Expert Group on Mobile Phones,
chaired by former UK Government Chief Scientiﬁc Adviser
(GCSA) Sir William Stewart. The IEGMP was formed in 1999,
with a remit not just to review the science but also to consider
“present concerns about the possible health effects from the use of
mobile phones, base stations and transmitters”. Its membership
blended international researchers on EMF risk research with
senior biological scientists who carried experience of policy
engagement, and two lay members.
The life of the IEGMP overlapped with two important reports
for UK science policy at the turn of the millennium. The IEGMP
published its conclusions (known as the Stewart Report) in May
2000. Three months earlier, a report had been published by the
House of Lords Science and Technology Committee on “Science
and Society” that captured and communicated the changing
dynamics of public engagement with science. Its pragmatic
conclusion was that:
Policy makers will ﬁnd it hard to win public support on any
issue with a science component, unless the public’s attitudes
and values are recognised, respected and weighed along with
the scientiﬁc and other factors. (House of Lords, 2000: 6)
The Committee’s recommendation that “direct dialogue with
the public should move from being an optional add-on to
science-based policy-making and to the activities of research
organisations and learned institutions, and should become a
normal and integral part of the process” (House of Lords, 2000:
paragraph 5.48) moved the British scientiﬁc elite away, at least
rhetorically, from a “deﬁcit model” of public engagement
(Wynne, 1993). The House of Lords report would come to
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represent a landmark for institutional openness towards public
dialogue on public science issues.
In October of the same year, the report of the Phillips Inquiry
into the Government’s handling of Bovine Spongiform Encepha-
lopathy was released. This narrated policy failures in the
commissioning and use of expert advice as the Government
systematically overlooked uncertainties about the public safety of
beef as part of a rhetoric of reassurance. It laid bare the politics of
expert advice, offering an exhaustive, multi-volume critique of the
limits of a technocratic, linear model of expert advice (see
Millstone and Van Zwanenberg, 2001). Within this model, which
was not unique to BSE, but also characterized the British
approach to nuclear power and chemicals regulation, The Public
were imagined solely as receivers of an expert consensus based on
“sound science”. Evidence from non-experts in these cases,
including farmers and factory workers, was routinely dismissed,
and often labelled merely “anecdotal” (Wynne, 1989; Irwin, 1995;
also Stilgoe et al., 2006).
The remedy offered by Phillips was one of openness and the
Government was quick to endorse his mantras:
 ‘Trust can only be generated by openness’;
 ‘Openness requires recognition of uncertainty, where it exists’;
 ‘The public should be trusted to respond rationally to
openness’;
 ‘Scientiﬁc investigation of risk should be open and transparent’;
 ‘The advice and reasoning of advisory committees should be
made public’.4
Sir William Stewart had told the Phillips Inquiry that, even
though he was GCSA from 1990–1995, preceding the Govern-
ment’s admission in 1996 that BSE had caused variant Creutzfeldt
Jacob Disease in humans, his involvement in the issue had been
“negligible”. Nevertheless, he admitted the importance of BSE to
the IEGMP’s thinking when asked by the House of Commons
Trade and Industry Select Committee in 2001:
The BSE inquiry impacted upon us. Never again will any
scientiﬁc committee say that there is no risk.
In Stewart’s reframing of the mobile phone risk issue, a number
of policy assumptions were deliberately destabilized. The ﬁrst of
these was the question of labelling. A year before the IEGMP
issued their report, an episode of the BBC’s ﬂagship investigative
TV journalism programme Panorama had “discovered” that large
variations in the Speciﬁc Absorption Rates of different mobile
phones. Even though all complied with current regulations, the
implication was that some were safer than others and that
concerned consumers should be able to choose. The pre-Stewart
regulatory presumption was that such distinctions were illegiti-
mate and labelling phones with their SAR levels would confuse
consumers; compliance was all (Stilgoe, 2005). Stewart, however,
recommended that mobile phones should be labelled with their
SAR levels, determined by an internationally standard procedure.
Labels should appear on the handset’s box, in leaﬂets at stores, on
a national web-site and as one of the phone’s menu options
(IEGMP, 2000, paragraph 1.52).
The endorsement of SAR labelling began to segment an
imagined public that had until that point been presumed to be
homogenous and uninterested in the science behind mobile
phone risk assessment (Stilgoe, 2007). The IEGMP also identiﬁed
and made explicit some other lines of segmentation. Their report
recognized the concerns of local communities who experienced
the imposition of mobile phone masts during the rapid rollout of
second-generation mobile phone networks in the 1990s. A policy
of “permitted development rights” had easer the planning
application process for all mobile phone masts less than 15 m
high and many of the masts erected in closest proximity to
people’s homes appeared on local authority properties, welcomed
by councils who were compensated by phone network companies.
A rash of protests among these communities blended messages of
alienation from decision-making with concern about the
uncertainties of constant, long-term exposure to electromagnetic
radiation. And while health concerns were not deemed to be a
“material consideration” in planning decisions, the IEGMP,
whose remit was health rather than planning, brought this
question into its purview. Their report ruled that current
planning rules were unacceptable, that base stations impacted
upon people’s well-being and that permitted development rights
should be revoked (IEGMP, 2000, paragraphs 1.30–1.40).
The IEGMP recommendation that received most media
attention was that children should be discouraged from using
mobile phones. The reasoning was that, “If there are currently
unrecognised adverse health effects from the use of mobile phones,
children may be more vulnerable because of their developing
nervous system, the greater absorption of energy in the tissues of
the head” (IEGMP, 2000, paragraph 1.53). Most mainstream
scientists felt that there was little scientiﬁc justiﬁcation for such a
recommendation. One told me during an interview, “this idea that
children are more vulnerable is complete politics” (“politics” here
was clearly intended to denote a distortion of science).
Reaching further still outside the previous scientiﬁc consensus,
the IEGMP also recommended that “the totality of the
information available, including non-peer-reviewed data and
anecdotal evidence, be taken into account when advice is
proffered” (paragraph 1.70). This recommendation and its
endorsement of a notion of “anecdotal evidence” that had
previously been used by advisory scientists in a pejorative sense is
symbolically important in the context of this and other public
science controversies (Moore and Stilgoe, 2009). Viewing the
practice of advice as a public experiment, the additional insight is
that this recommendation was discursively and pragmatically
linked with the establishment of a new research programme:
We recommend that a substantial research programme should
operate under the aegis of a demonstrably independent panel.
The aim should be to develop a programme of research related
to health aspects of mobile phones and associated technolo-
gies. This should complement work sponsored by the EU and
in other countries. In developing a research agenda the peer-
reviewed scientiﬁc literature, non-peer reviewed papers and
anecdotal evidence should be taken into account. (IEGMP,
2000, Paragraph 1.58)
The Mobile Telephones Health Research programme was set
up to ﬁll some of the space opened up and then vacated by the
temporary IEGMP. Its budget was modest relative to its aims,
which included large epidemiological studies: one case-control
study swallowed almost £1 million of the £7.4 million available
over 8 years. Stewart claimed that the aim of this programme was
to plug scientiﬁc holes, but it is better explained as a procedural
innovation. The programme was co-funded by industry and
government but agendas and allocations were tightly controlled
by a group whose membership overlapped with the IEGMP,
drawing on their renewed credibility. STS (for example, Collins,
1985) would predict that the outputs of research into, for
example, the external detectability of reported electrosensitivity
(the target of one MTHR study) would not settle the controversy
over the physiological basis of these symptoms.5 More important
than the answers generated by this new research are the new
questions that it chose to ask, which reﬂected a legitimation of the
public reframing of experimentation. So research into long-term
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exposure and vulnerable sub-populations, previously deemed
unimportant under a consensus about acute thermal effects, was
brought to the fore, at least discursively.
The Stewart report’s reconstruction of the mobile phones
health issue (with a dual reconstruction of both scientiﬁc
uncertainties and legitimate public concerns (Stilgoe, 2007))
was a clear departure from a pre-BSE technocratic mode, but it
did not comfortably land upon a coherent alternative. In this way,
the Stewart report rested on what Irwin (2006) has called an
“uneasy blend of ‘old’ and ‘new’ assumptions”. We can imagine
two models of expertise (see Table 1; also Millstone and Van
Zwanenberg, 2001). The mode of openness prescribed by Phillips
was more disruptive than the transparency that was being
advocated and grudgingly adopted in the early 2000s. Phillips’s
openness involved opening doors to new policy actors as well as
striving to open the minds of experts to new perspectives. Since
BSE, we have seen British advisory bodies attempting to bridge
the gap the between the two models of expertise, with sporadic
experiments in open governance, institutional redesign and
occasional nervous retreating.
Irwin (2006: 300) argues that “the new assumption appears to
be that greater public consultation over scientiﬁc and technolo-
gical developments can eliminate (or at least reduce) subsequent
opposition to technical change and achieve broad social
consensus. Transparency and openness are intended to win back
members of the public who have grown sceptical of governmental
risk-handling”. He goes on to say that researchers in STS should
adopt a reasonable degree of scepticism about the new rhetoric of
openness. So how should we view the Stewart report’s apparent
openness (and that of subsequent bodies in Sweden (see Soneryd,
2007))? As formal expert advice attempts to incorporate processes
of public dialogue, lay membership and transparency, it is
tempting to see such governance experiments as a lever for the
opening up of issues. However, using the lens of coproduction
(Jasanoff, 2004), we can see that such initiatives are as much a
symptom of openness as its cause. These micro-experiments are
part of the larger public experiment of democratic governance.
Mobilizing expert advice
As I discussed in this article’s introduction, the apparent fading of
the mobile phones risk issue might simply be explained according to
a risk/beneﬁt calculus. However, this framing neither explains the
nuances in the controversy, nor provides useful insights for the
future practice of scientiﬁc advice (see also Hom et al., 2011). I
instead read this case in terms of the social control of uncertainty.
First, the broader issue of EMF health effects has multiple objects of
concern, whose uncertainties are unevenly distributed. Public
controversies over mobile phone masts, for example, may adopt
the language of health risk, but they are always about more besides,
encompassing the politics of planning and the imposition of
infrastructure (Drake, 2010; Hermans, 2014).
Since 2000, while general public concern about mobile phone
risks has died down in the United Kingdom, it has sporadically
bubbled up in other countries. Hermans considers the politics of
mobile phone infrastructure siting in the Netherlands, high-
lighting the limits of “risk” language in dialogue between experts
and publics, which typically also touches upon considerations of
democracy, fairness, aesthetics and property prices. A loss of
control by Dutch experts has seen citizens attempt to reclaim
experimentation with the generation of alternative knowledge
through the use of personal dosimeters (Hermans, 2014). The
challenge is not just to expert practice, but also to scholarly
analysis, which still privileges explanations that pretend “the
solution is to mind the gap between laypersons’ and experts’
views on the risks” (Hermans, 2014: 26). Similarly, Borraz (2011)
has described how in France, just as with the NRPB, the attempt
to govern this issue as one of risk has led to an expansion and loss
of control of uncertainty.
Concerns over the rollout of subsequent technologies, whose
EMF exposures may be similar but whose distributions of risk,
beneﬁt and ethical concerns may vary, suggest that the issue has
morphed rather than died. Wireless smart meters (Hess and
Coley, 2014) and Wi-Fi in schools (Bale, 2006) have resurfaced
some of the same questions that characterized the mobile phones
controversy.
It is of course impossible to say deﬁnitively whether expert
advice has been successful, not least because of disagreements on
the purposes of expert advice and the multiple and conﬂicting
interests with which it must necessarily engage. We can
acknowledge, however, instances where experts appear to
recognize and engage with the coproductions (Jasanoff, 2004)
of which they are a part. The IEGMP did not attempt the
separation of risk from politics that had characterized previous
engagements. Its precautionary approach, I have argued,
reframed the issue as one of ongoing experimentation. For those
working with a linear model of expert advice, this approach,
which involved explicitly widening the bounds of legitimate
uncertainty, seemed risky. And some social scientists have
criticized the Stewart report in these terms. Burgess (2004) read
the controversy as a straightforward “health panic”, while
Durodié saw the IEGMP “elevating public opinion over
professional expertise and subordinating science to prejudice”
(Durodié, 2009: 112). One experimental study claims to
demonstrate that precautionary recommendations amplify risk
perceptions (Wiedemann and Schütz, 2005). Not only are such
analyses analytically ﬂawed, in that they fail to engage with the
technical or political speciﬁcities of issues, but they are also
counterproductive for expert practice. Focus group research
suggests no clear evidence of increased public concern in response
to precautionary advice on EMFs (Timotijevic and Barnett, 2006).
However, we should keep hold of the insight that public issues are
in part constructed by their governance, rather than being a
product either of ﬁxed risk perception or technological essence.
As Barry (2001) argues, the attempt to aggressively depoliticize
issues by experts will lead to politics bubbling up in new and
surprising places.
The trouble with interpreting the issue as one of risk, whether
in scholarly research or advisory practice, is that it becomes static:
scientiﬁc opinion and public opinion are both imagined as
immutable. If we look instead at coproduced technical uncertain-
ties and politics, we can better understand the potential for
mobility of both science and publics, and account for the success
of the IEGMP in regaining control of a high-stakes issue.
The science of EMF risk, while anchored to a well-known
thermal mechanism and represented by a dosimetric unit (SAR),
was shown to have far more ﬂexibility than had been acknowl-
edged by the NRPB. Crucially, as the IEGMP realised, “science”
Table 1 | Two models of expertise (from Stilgoe et al., 2006)
Old model of expertise New model of expertise
Closed Open
Homogenous Diverse
Hubristic Humble
Demanding public trust Trusting the public
Expecting expert consensus and
prescription
Expecting plural and conditional
advice
Managerial control Distributed control
Presenting the evidence Presenting evidence, judgement and
uncertainty
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here was not just about answers, it was also about relevant
research questions. The IEGMP reframed science in terms of
experimentation as well as evidence and, in demanding the
construction of a reframed research programme, invited non-
experts into the experiment. Similarly, in its public engagement,
the IEGMP did not presume a static view of public opinion. With
the move from deﬁcit to dialogue in public engagement, public
opinion has acquired new signiﬁcance in expert advisory
processes. In her study of public dialogue practice around mobile
phone risks in Sweden, Soneryd (2007) talks in terms of
“articulations” of public concern rather than ﬁxed public opinion,
with the recognition that articulations can change, and can be a
way of navigating around things that may be “unsayable” in
certain circumstances. (Elsewhere, Lezaun and Soneryd (2007)
have described institutional nervousness of stakeholder interests
in dialogue exercises precisely because their attitudes are seen as
ﬁxed, even if the stakeholders themselves describe the possibility
of rearticulation through dialogue).
The recognition that publics and science are both mobile
challenges dominant metaphors of ideal policy as “evidence-based”.
As research in policy studies has argued, following Lindblom (1959),
policymakers cannot expect a synoptic sense of the relevant evidence
before making decisions. Policy might better be understood as a
process of “puzzling together” (see Porteous, 2016 for a review). The
more empirically and normatively satisfying view of expert advice in
practice might be one of “collective experimentation” (Latour, 1998),
in which experts and publics recognize together that the process is
an open-ended one. Treating expert advice as a public experiment
democratizes the possibility of surprise and treats uncertainty as
inevitable rather than intrinsically problematic. When mobile
phones were ﬁrst available and very few people owned one, they
were ofﬁcially safe. Now, the jury is ofﬁcially out on the risks of
mobile phones, and we seem to be OK with it. The question “are
mobile phones safe?” will not be settled until questions of trust,
credibility and the validity of ongoing research are resolved, and
such things are largely unresolvable. The safety of mobile phones
therefore represents a work-in-progress.
Notes
1 Collins and Evans attempt to translate understandings of the closure of esoteric
laboratory controversies into the public domain. As Jasanoff (2003) puts it, “this
translation does not work” (395). In a later attempt to connect their theory more
explicitly to politics and policy, Collins et al. (2011) have, in the words of one of their
critics, “moved backwards rather than forwards” (Fischer, 2011: 312), reproducing a
linear model in which a “technical phase” is followed by a “political phase” and facts
are divorced from values.
2 ANSI (American National Standards Institute) 1982 and NCRP (National Council on
Radiation Protection) 1986.
3 Dr John Stather, NRPB, talking on the Money Programme, BBC2, 18 April 1999.
4 Response to the Report Of The BSE Inquiry by HM Government in consultation with
the devolved Administrations, http://www.defra.gov.uk/animalh/bse/general/response.
pdf
5 It is interesting to note that one study funded by the MTHR programme attempting to
answer this question (Rubin et al., 2006) generated the further research question of
why participants appeared not to believe experimental evidence when told they were
unable to detect the ﬁelds that they reported as harmful (Nieto-Hernandez et al.,
2008).
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